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Abstract
We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identi-
cal, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game
randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that
of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of
players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider
both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As il-
lustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot,
Stackelberg, cartel).
Keywords Dynamic game, Bernoulli process of entry, Oligopoly
JEL classification : C72, C61, D21, L13
∗BIOCORE team, INRIA Sophia Antipolis-Me´diterrane´e, France. Pierre.Bernhard@inria.fr
†Universite´ de Franche-Comte´ CRESE, BETA-CNRS and OFCE-Sciences Po.
Marc.Deschamps@univ-fcomte.fr
We thank Ce´line Savard-Chambard, Saı¨d Souam, Nicolas Eber and Herve´ Moulin for conversations
and comments that improved the paper. We received very useful suggestions from Sylvain Be´al.
Marc Deschamps acknowledges the financial support of ANR Damage (programme ANR-12-JSH1-
0001, 2012-2015). The usual disclaimer applies.
1
1 Introduction
In most strategic interactions analysis the set of players is known and common
knowledge. But there are some situations where neither the players, nor the de-
signer or public authority, nor the theorist know how many players are in a game.
As an illustration, consider the three situations below:
Example 1
Imagine the case of a company that commits a violation of competition rules
(which identically affects consumers) in a country where consumers can take joint
action in court to recover the amount of their losses. The legal system chosen by
the country as part of a joint action works as follows: in the first period a consumer
enters the court, in the second period the judge analyses the case. If he finds it
justified, he evaluates the total harm done1, and imposes a reimbursement and a
payments schedule for each month of a third period. But during that third period,
more complainants may apply to join the action, given that the judge will not ap-
prove more than one per month. The monthly reimbursement is then shared equally
among all complainants approved at that time. What is the first consumer-victim
expected payoff according to the fact that he does not know how many victims will
participate in the joint action as each victim can alternatively choose to never suit
or suit individually the company?
Example 2
Consider the case of a city where the authorities issue a number of permits to
individuals so that they can transport by car, for a fee, people in the city. There
are k individuals who have such an authorization. Then, thanks to technological
innovation, a company is able to transform every willing motorist driver into a
transporter of people for fee. How much individuals k who have the permission
of the city can expect, knowing that they do not know how many motorists will be
turned into drivers?
1On the one hand, in a joint action, this country chooses to charge the total harm to the liable party.
On the other hand, it allows each victim not to prosecute, prosecute individually or collectively. It
thus follows that the liable party can be led to pay several times the damage which she caused: these
are punitive damages.
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Example 3
Suppose that a French rich entrepreneur decides to create the “Rene´ and Gise`le
Foundation” to promote the research in game theory. This foundation, thanks to the
proceeds of a charitable donation, appoints a benevolent research director (free of
conflicts of interest) to share each month equally a sum of 100.000 euros between
all scientific projects in game theory which she has examined and fond valuable.
As the entrepreneur and the research director want to provide a long term support,
they decide to never abandon the funding of a project that she had already selected.
After the beginning of the foundation, where k ≥ 1 projects could have been
selected, each month, due to administrative procedures, only one new project could
be added to the foundation’s public list of selected projects (which mentions the
date of arrival in the list of each selected project). How much the m− th selected
project can expect to have?
The goal of this paper is to provide a general mathematical framework for comput-
ing the payoff of players in a dynamic game with clone players randomly arriving
at each step of time in a Bernoulli process. The paper is organized as follows: in
the next section we expose the theoretical related literature and explain how we
contribute to the question of games with an unknown number of players. In sec-
tion 3, we formulate the problem, propose a model and give the expected payoff of
finite (Theorem 1) and infinite (Theorem 2) horizon game, that is the expected pay-
off for each player. Then in Section 4 we provide some examples from oligopoly
theory where this framework and results could be used to find expected payoff and
static equilibria. Section 5 concludes by underlining the limits and questions of our
framework which are left for future research.
2 Related literature
It is well known that the usual-textbook game theory toolbox is in the the ”fixed-n”
paradigm and so provides directly no solution to problems where there is a degree
of uncertainty on the number of players in a game. Indeed, in Bayesian games, the
uncertainty is on the type of each other player’s, that is on their private informa-
tion about their characteristic represented by a random variable for each player. So
there is no uncertainty on the number of players in the game, the uncertainty is on
their characteristics. Moreover to extend Bayesian games to games with unknown
number of players raises conceptual and modelling issues that could not be over-
come. However, to the best of our knowledge, there exists currently in game theory
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two ways to directly manage the question of uncertainty on the number of players
in a game.
The first strain of literature, which is the oldest one, is the study of games where
the active competing players is not common knowledge. This issue has taken two
forms (see [Levin and Ozdenoren, 2004]). The first form models the number of
active players with a stochastic process on a set of potential players. It means
that the active players is a subset of the common knowledge potential players,
which implies that each player has a private information (he is active or not). The
timing of this kind of game is usually in four-step: 1/ nature chooses which players
will be active (and whose those will be passive), 2/ each player observes only
his own situation, 3/ the active players choose their strategies, and 4/ payoffs are
received. The common knowledge information is the set of potential players and
the probability distribution used by the nature to assign a role to each player. The
second form endogenizes the entry process. In this setting, at first, there is no
player in the market. Then, there is the assumption that each potential player (the
total set of which is common knowledge) has a privately known and different cost
to entry on the market, and each of them must decide to participate or not into
the game. These two kinds of models are useful in a great number of cases. For
example, consider the situation of an appointment of Dean at a University, the
applicants do not know how many persons will apply even if they perfectly know
how many persons can apply (the set of Professors in the University). It is also the
case, for example, in online auction sites where the number of registers is known
and the number of bidders for each product is ex ante unknown.
Seminal articles in this line of literature are [McAfee and McMillan, 1987a] and
[Matthews, 1987] which demonstrate that some results of auction theory could be
sensitive to the assumption that there is a stochastic number of bidders, which
means that the set of real bidders is not common knowledge whereas the set of
potential bidders is. They also allow the bidders to have different priors on how
many bidders are present as long as these priors are Bayesian consistent. From the
design policy point of view these articles open the question wether the seller had
an interest to reveal (or conceal) the number of actual bidders and their identities.
In [Piccione and Tan, 1996] the number of potential bidders is common knowledge
but some of them are experts (bidders with private information) and some are non-
experts (bidders with no private information), and it is the number of experts which
is uncertain for the seller and the other buyers. [Mu¨nster, 2006] offers a study of
rent-seeking contests with an unknown number of competing contestants where all
players are risk neutral or have constant absolute risk aversion. Complementing to
the pure risk approach, [Salo and Weber, 2007] and [Levin and Ozdenoren, 2004]
propose models where bidders are adverse to the ambiguity generated by the lack
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of information about the number of rivals in the auction. On the entry process
endogenous side, [Samuelson, 1985] finds that policies to limit the number of bid-
ders may be welfare improving. When a first-price sealed bid auction is used and
bidders can enter upon paying an entry cost, [McAfee and McMillan, 1987b] show
that the seller should not impose a reserve price higher than his own valuation and
that the optimal number of bidders enter. More recently, there has been investiga-
tions on environmental topics as in [Rubio and Ulph, 2007] or [Breton et al., 2010,
Breton and Keoula, 2012].
The more recent other strain of literature is games with population uncertainty,
where the real number of players in the market is not common knowledge. But the
number of players really in the game is supposed to be drawn from a random vari-
able, whose probability distribution and mean are commonly known. Players have
to choose their strategies before the player set is revealed. Among these games,
a special attention has been served to the sub-class called Poisson games, where
the number of players N is a random variable that follows a Poisson distribution
with mean n (so N = k with the probability e
−nnk
k! ), and each player’s type is
then drawn independently from some fixed probability distribution. More gener-
ally, in extended Poisson games the expected population sizes and players’ utility
functions may depend on an unknown state of the world. In this case there is a
two-stage structure: first a random state variable is drawn from some given distri-
bution, and then a Poisson game is played. In theses games, each player’s belief
about the number of other players and their types is the same with the prior distri-
bution of the total number of players and their types (property called by Myerson
environmental equivalence). It has been show that Poisson games modelling has
very nice mathematical features, subsume Bayesian games with consistent priors
and open a fertile field of research. To illustrate the nature of questions solved by it
[De Sinopoli and Pimienta, 2009] introduces the following simple and clear story:
”A player is sitting at home and faces two possible alternatives, either she goes out
to some social event, or she stays home. She does not know how many players are
facing this same disjunctive, but she knows that this number is a Poisson random
variable with parameter n. If she goes out and meets somebody she receives a pay-
off equal to 1. If she meets nobody or decides to stay home, she gets a payoff equal
to 0. Every player faces these same two options and has the same preferences”.
This type of modelling was introduced by [Myerson, 1998b], [Myerson, 1998a],
[Myerson, 2000] and [Milchtaich, 2004]. See also [De Sinopoli et al., 2014] for a
more recent account. It seems particularly well adapted to elections (where each
voter does not know what is the real number of voters, see Myerson’s works) or
some kind of auctions. [Makris, 2008] proposes to model the coordination problem
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as a Poisson game and investigates the conditions under which a unique equilib-
rium is selected. In [Ritzberger, 2009] it is shown that with population uncertainty,
two competitors are not enough to eliminate all profits in equilibrium and have
competition in a Bertrand game. Recently, [O¨stling et al., 2011] proposes an ap-
plication of Poisson game to a LUPI game (lowest unique positive integer wins
lottery), in order to study a lottery called Limbo introduced by the government-
owned Swedish gambling monopoly Svenska Spel on January 29, 2007.
By contrast with these two lines of literature, the spirit of our paper is a dynamic
framework where the number of players involved varies with time, and to study the
expected payoff of each player in situations where nobody knows ex ante the set
of real players at each period after the beginning and at the end of the game (finite
case), or at each period of the game (infinite case). The only information that are
common knowledge before the game actually starts in our setup are the size of the
market, the number of incumbents and that there is a random entry at each period of
time according to a Bernoulli process of known parameter. Once the game is going,
the actual number of players present at each stage is also common knowledge at
that stage. So there is no asymmetric information in our model. We will consider
a clone economy, i.e an economy where the incumbents and the new entrants are
perfectly identical. Even though there is an equilibrium at each step, our aim at this
stage will not be to define a dynamical equilibrium, but to compute the expected
payoff to the players when their strategic behaviors are given. Therefore we have
a sequence of static equilibria, but not a dynamic equilibrium. (See nevertheless
appendix D).
In the rest of the literature on games, but with a fixed number of players, we may
find some kinship of our theory with repeated games, since the folk theorem, for
instance, involves an infinite sequence of plays with the same strategies, as we do.
But there, it is the same set of players who play again and again. The fact that in
the present theory, the payment matrices vary from step to step is reminiscent of
stochastic games, see e.g. [Neyman and Sorin, 2003] or, more recently, the special
issue [Nowak et al., 2013]. However, we are not, at this stage, able to prove a result
about a stationary dynamic equilibrium, as often found in that strain of literature.
Finally, the literature the closest to our theory that we are aware of may be that of
piecewise deterministic systems [Davis, 1985, Haurie et al., 1994], although this is
not in a game theoretic framework. But we may consider the stochastic arrivals of
players as stochastic jumps in the dynamic system, which is deterministic between
two jumps. We show in appendix D how that theory could be put to use to compute
a dynamic equilibrium. But at this stage, applying these ideas to concrete examples
seems out of reach.
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3 Model
The family of problems we are investigating could have two forms. As in our
examples 1 and 3, there are cases where the dynamic game has an end which cor-
responds to a finite horizon. There are also cases, as in our example 2, where the
dynamic game has no finite end-time or, more realistically, where the end-time is
unknown for the players, which corresponds to the infinite horizon case. We will
study these two types of games successively.
We consider a discrete time, multistage game where time t is an integer varying
from t1 to T (finite horizon), or from 0 to ∞ (infinite horizon). We assume that
additional players may arrive only one at each discrete instant of time, this with a
probability p and independently from other arrivals (a Bernoulli process), and let
tm be the first stage where there are m players, i. e. the stage when player number
m arrives.
Usually, in a dynamic game there is a state x(t) ∈ Rn whose dynamics are driven
by the actions ai(·) of the players, according to some given law
x(t+ 1) = f(t, x(t), a1(t), a2(t), . . . an(t)) , x(t1) = x1 .
Then the payoff of each player is
Πi =
T∑
t=t1
Li(t, x(t), a1(t), a2(t), . . . , an(t)) .
If the ai are mixed strategies, then Li is a mathematical expectation.
However, here the emphasis is not on the strategies but on computing an expected
payoff when the strategies are assumed identical for all players, and known as a
function of the number m of players present, the state, and current time. In that
case, a sufficient description of the state is the sequence {tn}n≤m of past arrival
times, and current time t. As a consequence, we may dispense with the explicit
dynamics, and write the payoff as a function of these variables. We also assume
that the players are identical not only in their strategy choices, but also in their
per stage payoff. (The latter justifies the former. We will however see a marginal
deviation from that hypothesis in our examples.) Their payoffs will only differ
because of their different arrival times.
Notation Let τ1 = t1, and for m ≥ 2, τm = (t2, . . . , tm) ∈ Nm−1, and therefore
τm+1 = (τm, tm+1). Let Lm(τm, t) be the per stage payoff of each player when m
players are present. Let also m(t) be the number of players present at time t .
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We introduce the further notation M1(t) = L1(t), and, for m ≥ 2,
Tm(t) = {τm | t1 < t2 < · · · < tm ≤ t} , Mm(t) =
∑
τm∈Tm(t)
Lm(τm, t) .
(in the infinite horizon case, we will use t1 = 0). For example,
M2(t) =
t∑
t2=t1+1
L2(t2, t) , M3(t) =
t−1∑
t2=t1+1
t∑
t3=t2+1
L3(t2, t3, t) .
We may provide a graphical representation of what is going on. All possible en-
trance histories, for a finite horizon, can be represented on a tree as in figure 1.
Time is shown on the bottom line. At each instant of time, and at each node of the
tree for that instant, we draw a branch going up if a new player enters at that time
instant, going down if nobody enters. We have chosen t1 = 0, shown four time
steps, and labelled the nodes with the number of players present upon reaching this
node (during the time step ending there). We have noted over each branch the per
stage payoff of each player during the corresponding time step.
An history is represented by a path from the root of the tree (to the left) to a leaf.
The payoff for that history is the (“horizontal”) sum of the per stage payoffs noted
on each branch of its path (τm is denoted with a list of time instants between curly
braces). For each m and t, Mm(t) is the (“vertical”) sum of the Lm of stage t, i.e.
the sum of the markings of the branches of the stage beginning at t reaching a node
labelled m.
One can read on this graph that:
M1(0) = L1(0) ,
M1(1) = L1(1) ,
M2(1) = L2({1}, 1) ,
M1(2) = L1(2) ,
M2(2) = L2({1}, 2) + L2({2}, 2) ,
M3(2) = L3({1, 2}, 2) ,
M1(3) = L1(3) ,
M2(3) = L2({1}, 3) + L2({2}, 3) + L2({3}, 3) ,
M3(3) = L3({1, 2}, 3) + L3({1, 3}, 3) + L3({2, 3}, 3) ,
M4(3) = L4({1, 2, 3}, 3) .
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Figure 1: The events tree
3.1 Finite horizon
To better take into account the different arrival times of the players, we introduce
an explicit discount factor r ≤ 1, and write the payoff of the n-th player arrived as
Πn(τn) =
T∑
t=tn
rt−tnLm(t)(τm(t), t) .
Both m(t) and τm are random variables. Hence we let
Πen(τn) = EΠn .
We will prove the theorem:
Theorem 1 The expected payoff of the discrete time, finite horizon game for player
1 is
Πe1 =
T∑
t=t1
[r(1− p)]t−t1
t−t1+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
Mm(t) . (1)
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We observe that thus the dependence of the per stage payoff on the sequence of
arrival times has been lumped into the sequence of Mm. This is directly related to
the fact that, for a Bernoulli process, at the number m of positive events given, all
sequences ofm arrival times share the same (conditional) probability. Accordingly,
the dependence of the expected payoff on the per stage probability of arrival p is
through the probabilities pm−1(1− p)t−t1−m+1 of having m− 1 arrivals between
t1 + 1 and t.
The fact that Πe1 is decreasing in p, necessarily true, is not obvious in the formula
(it depends on the evaluation of the Mm to be seen further down). Yet, it appears
clearly that the limit expected payoff as p goes to zero is just
Πe1 =
T∑
t=t1
rt−t1L1(t) ,
as the term m = 1 only remains in the sum over m.
Proof of the theorem The proof of the theorem is given in appendix A.1. It is
based upon a rather classical backward induction argument, and interchanges of
orders of summations in the resulting formulas.
We may also write the equivalent formula for the payoff of them-th arriving player.
We need to introduce extra notation. For 1 ≤ m < k:
τkm = (τm+1, . . . , τk) , T km(tm, t) = {τkm | tm < tm+1 < · · · < tk ≤ t}.
and
Mmm (τm, t) = Lm(τm, t) and M
k
m(τm, t) =
∑
τkm∈T km(t)
Lk(τm, τ
k
m, t) .
Given m and tm, the maximum possible number of players is m + T − tm. By a
computation similar to the one leading to the theorem, we get:
Corollary 1 The payoff of the m-th arriving player, given the sequence of arrival
times τm, is
Πem(τm) =
T−tm∑
`=0
(
p
1− p
)` T∑
t=tm+`
[(1− p)r]t−tmMm+`m (τm, t) ,
or, equivalently
Πem(τm) =
T∑
t=tm
[(1− p)r]t−tm
t−tm∑
`=0
(
p
1− p
)`
Mm+`m (τm, t) . (2)
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3.2 Infinite horizon
The same set up is used to consider the game with an infinite horizon, i.e. a payoff
Π1 =
∞∑
t=0
rtLm(t)(τm(t), t) .
We need two new definitions:
Definition 1 The sequence of functions {Lm} is said to be
1. uniformly bounded if it has a uniform bound, denoted L:
∃L > 0 : ∀t ∈ R+ ,∀m ∈ N , ∀τm ∈ Tm(t) , |Lm(τm, t)| ≤ L ,
2. exponentially bounded if each Lm is uniformly bounded, but that bound is
allowed to vary exponentially with m:
∃L > 0 : ∀t ∈ R+ , ∀m ∈ N ,∀τm ∈ Tm(t) , |Lm(τm, t)| ≤ Lm .
The relationship of these properties depends on the position of L with respect to 1:
Remark 1
1. If the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded, it is also exponentially bounded,
thus uniformly bounded is a stronger property than exponentially bounded.
Indeed, let L be the uniform bound, the sequence is exponentially bounded
by Lm if L > 1, by 1m = 1 if L ≤ 1.
2. If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded by Lm with L < 1, it is
also uniformly bounded by L. However, if L > 1, it may not be uniformly
bounded.
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2 If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded by Lm and r < 1/L,
or if it is uniformly bounded, then the expected payoff of the infinite horizon game
is given by
Πe1 =
∞∑
t=0
((1− p)r)t
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
Mm(t) . (3)
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Proof The proof, given in appendix A.2, is via taking the limit in formula 1, and
carefully checking that the infinite series converge.
We derive the following consequences:
Corollary 2
• If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded by Lm with 1 ≤ L < 1/r,
then
|Πe1| ≤
L
1− rL ,
• if the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded by L, then
|Πe1| ≤
L
1− r ,
• if the Lm are constant and equal to L, and p = 0, then
Πe1 =
L
1− r .
We may similarly extend formula (2) to an infinite series, which converges under
the same conditions:
Corollary 3 The infinite horizon payoff of the m-th arriving player is, under the
same conditions as in theorem 2:
Πem(τm) = r
tm
∞∑
t=tm
((1− p)r)t−tm
t−tm∑
`=0
(
p
1− p
)`
Mm+`m (τm, t) .
4 Applications to oligopoly theory
We consider identical firms entering a market. The game will be played over
an infinite horizon, with a discount factor r. We investigate four different mar-
ket structures, differing in the type of equilibrium —cartel or competitive a` la
Cournot— hypothesized at each stage, and in the behavior of the incumbents and
of the new entrant each time one arrives. The four possible market structures will
be called “cartel-cartel”, “cartel-Stackelberg”, “Cournot-Cournot”, and “Cournot-
Stackelberg”, and will be explained in more detail below.
The per stage profits for the various equilibria considered are computed in the
appendix B.
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4.1 Cartel-cartel, or equally sharing a fixed revenue flux
In this simple case, the incumbents form a cartel, and each arriving new firm enters
the cartel. If the optimum per stage profit feasible by a lone player on this market
is c, we have Lm(τm, t) = c/m. We assert
Theorem 3 In the cartel-cartel market structure, the expected payoff to the first
player is
Πe1 =
c
pr
ln
(
1 +
pr
1− r
)
. (4)
We are therefore able to get a closed form formula. It exhibits the limit expected
payoff Πe1 = c/(1− r) as p goes to zero, and Πe1 →∞ as r → 1 for fixed p. That
it is decreasing with p can be seen in the fact that the function x 7→ ln(1 + x)/x is
decreasing for x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of theorem 3 The cardinal of the set Tm(t) is
|Tm(t)| =
(
t
m− 1
)
=
t!
(m− 1)!(t−m+ 1)!
we obtain
Mm(t) = c
t!
m!(t−m+ 1)! =
c
t+ 1
(
t+ 1
m
)
,
and hence, applying formula (3),
Πe1 = c
∞∑
t=0
rt(1− p)t 1
t+ 1
t+1∑
m=1
(
t+ 1
m
)(
p
1− p
)m−1
=
c
pr
∞∑
t=0
rt+1(1− p)t+1
t+ 1
[(
1 +
p
1− p
)t+1
− 1
]
.
It suffices to recognize the identity, for x < 1:
∞∑
n=1
xn
n
= −ln(1− x)
to conclude the proof.
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It is possible to compute the expected payoff of the m-th arriving player, but we
see little hope of simplifying it beyond the sheer repetition of the formula:
Πem(τm) = cr
tm−t1
∞∑
t=tm
[r(1− p)]t−tm
t−tm∑
`=0
1
m+ `
(t− tm)!
`!(t− tm − `)!
(
p
1− p
)`
,
or the slightly more appealing formula, that exhibits the independence of Πem from
τm:
Corollary 4 The payoff of the m-th arriving player in the cartel-cartel market
structure is
Πem(τm) = cr
tm−t1
∞∑
n=0
rnn!
n∑
`=0
1
m+ `
p`
`!
(1− p)n−`
(n− `)! .
4.2 Cartel-Stackelberg
In this market structure, in the absence of a new entrant, firms form a cartel. How-
ever, whenever a new firm enters the market, the incumbents still play as a cartel,
but act as leaders imposing their strategy on the new entrant who acts as a follower,
in a Stackelberg scheme. The table in the appendix shows that we may equivalently
assume that the incumbents do not take immediate notice of the new entrant, or do
not take it seriously, and continue with the same production level as before.
After a first step in that configuration, the new entrant joins the cartel for the rest
of the game. It is not its best interest. But it may be coerced to do so by the other
players who threat to revert otherwise to an all Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As soon
as m > 6, they incur a loss in doing so, but not as much as the new entrant. It is
therefore a credible threat.
-
tm− 1 players tm m players tm+1
Cartel (m− 1) Cartel (m) Cartel (m) or (m+1)
-
tm− 1 players tm m players tm+1
Cartel (m− 1) Stackelberg (m−1 vs 1)
Cartel (m) or
Stackelberg (m vs 1)
Figure 2: The time diagrams of the Cartel-Cartel (top) and Cartel-Stackelberg (bot-
tom) market structures
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The difference with the cartel-cartel time structure is displayed by the simple time
diagrams of Figure 2, where we have assumed, for clarity, that tm−1 < tm− 1, i.e.
there was no new entrant at time tm − 1.
According to the table in the appendix, we have, for some positive number c:
Lm(τm, tm) =
c
2(m− 1) ,
∀t ∈ [tm + 1, tm+1 − 1] , Lm(τm, t) = c
m
.
We state the following theorem:
Theorem 4 The expected payoff of the cartel-Stackelberg scheme for the first player
is
Πe1 = c
[
1 +
2− p
2p
ln
(
1 +
pr
1− r
)]
.
Although slightly more complicated than in the cartel-cartel scheme, this formula
shares with the former one most of its characters: a closed form formula, exhibiting
even more clearly its decreasing character with p, and converging to V = c/(1−r)
as p→ 0, and V →∞ as r → 1.
Proof The proof, given in appendix A.4 involves a careful analysis of the combi-
natorics of the problem, and application of the previous formulas.
Finally, the payoff to the m-th arriving player at time tm can be derived from the
corresponding formula of the simple sharing problem, just correcting for the fact
that at its first step, it earns c/4 rather than c/m.
Corollary 5 The payoff of the m − th arriving player in the cartel-Stackelberg
market structure is
Πem(tm) = r
tm−t1
[
c
4
− c
m
+ c
∞∑
n=0
rnn!
n∑
`=0
1
m+ `
p`
`!
(1− p)n−`
(n− `)!
]
.
4.3 Cournot-Cournot
We now assume that at each time step, the firms compete in a Cournot fashion.
With reference to the diagrams of Figure 2, we now have that of Figure 3
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-
tm− 1 players tm m players tm+1
Cournot (m− 1) Cournot (m)
Cournot (m) or
Cournot (m+ 1)
Figure 3: The time diagram of the Cournot-Cournot market structure
As a consequence, there is a positive number C such that
Lm =
C
(m+ 1)2
.
We also assume a discount factor r as in the above theory. A direct application of
the general theory leads to
Theorem 5 The expected payoff of the first player in the Cournot-Cournot market
structure is
Πe1 = C
∞∑
t=0
rt(1− p)t
t∑
n=0
(
p
1− p
)n t!
(t− n)!n!
1
(n+ 2)2
. (5)
This is not a very appealing formula. Yet, it is easy to program, even on a spread-
sheet, to get a numerical approximation, computing the terms recursively. Write
u(t) = rt(1− p)t ,
vn(t) =
(
p
1− p
)n t!
(t− n)!n!
1
(n+ 2)2
,
Πe1,C = C
∞∑
t=0
u(t)
t∑
n=0
vn(t) ,
and compute the u and vn according to the recursions u(0) = 1, v0(t) = 1/4,
∀n > t, vn(t) = 0, and, for n ≤ t, t ≥ 1:
u(t) = r(1− p)u(t− 1) ,
vn(t) =
p
1− p
(
n+ 1
n+ 2
)2
vn−1(t− 1) + vn(t− 1) .
Computing up to the fiftieth term, with r = .8, we found, for p = 1/4, Πe1,C =
.822C, for p = 1/2, Πe1,C = .625C, and for p = 3/4, Π
e
1,C = .508C. (To get the
same precision, the computation requires the more terms that p is smaller. With 50
terms, for p = 0, we get Πe1,C = 1.249986 instead of the theoretical 1.25. These
computations were performed on a spreadsheet LibreOffice.)
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4.4 Cournot-Stackelberg scheme
We consider a scheme similar to that of the cartel-Stackelberg, but where firms
compete a` la Cournot-Nash instead of forming a cartel, both in the absence of a
newcomer, and within the group of incumbents when a new firm enters the mar-
ket. As in the cartel-Stackelberg structure, the behavior of the incumbents may be
explained as ignoring the newcomer at the first step. Then (as soon as m ≥ 2), all
players profit from a reversal to the all Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The time diagram is now as in Figure 4
-
tm− 1 players tm m players tm+1
Cournot (m− 1) Stackelberg (m−1 vs 1)
Cournot (m) or
Stackelberg (m vs 1)
Figure 4: The time diagram of the Cournot-Stackelberg market structure
We therefore have
Lm(τm, tm) =
C
2m2
,
∀t ∈ [tm + 1, tm+1 − 1] , Lm(τm, t) = C
(m+ 1)2
.
The analysis is completely similar to that of the cartel-Stackelberg scheme, replac-
ing the Lm as necessary, and leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 6 Let Πe1,C be the Cournot expected payoff (5). The expected payoff of
the Cournot-Stackelberg scheme for the first player is
Πe1,CS =
r(2− p)
2
Πe1,C + C .
We may notice that the relationship of this formula to the preceding one is the
same as the corresponding one in the cartel case. It preserves the same properties
as outlined above.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a model where there is, for everyone, an unknown
number of players. We have assumed that all the players are clones (since they
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adopt the same strategy and had the same payoff at each period of time) and that de-
mand market and entry device (Bernoulli process) are common knowledge. Play-
ers’ payoff differ from each other only due to the time during which they are in the
market. In this setting we are able to calculate the payoff of each player in finite
and infinite horizon games. Four simple examples in microeconomics show that
the theory is indeed operative. The formulas obtained are not very simple, but they
allow for efficient numerical implementations.
Yet, we may point out a set of weaknesses of the theory, each of which points to
possible further investigations.
• We are limited to a clone economy. Dealing with an unlimited number of
players, the game has to be anonymous. But we might want to have several
classes of players, such as done in many studies of population uncertainty
and anonymous games.
• To keep with the simple formulas of the Bernoulli process, we impose a
constant entry probability p. It would be more realistic to have it depend on
the number of players already on the market, as the benefit of entry decreases
with that number. This is chiefly true in our examples where the size of
the market is constant. This would lead to exceedingly complex formulas,
hardly implementable, except may be if we let p be a constant up to a certain
number of players and drop to zero afterward.
• In our four examples, the players’ per stage payoff depend on the number of
players, and only very mildly on the sequence of past arrival times. (In the
one-step Stackelberg games, where we need to distinguish the case t = tm
from the case t > tm.) A more complex dependence such as alluded to at the
beginning of section 3, say because a resource is consumed by the players,
requires, to remain manageable by our theory, that it be explicit enough to
let us compute the sums Mm. A rather severe restriction on the models we
are able to deal with.
• We do not allow for players randomly leaving the market. Yet, in many
applications, this would be more realistic.
But as it is, the theory can probably be used as a Rubinstein “fable” ([Rubinstein, 2006,
Rubinstein, 2012]) to investigate some real life economic problems.
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A Proofs of the theorems
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
We remark the maximum number of players is T − t1 + 1, can only be attained at
time T , and only if a player has arrived at each instant of time. We then have
ΠeT−t1+1(t1, t1 + 1, . . . , T ) = LT−t1+1(T ) = MT−t1+1(T ) .
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For m ≤ T − t1 and a compatible τm, we have
Jm(τm) =

T∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t) if tm+1 > T ,
tm+1−1∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t) + rtm+1−tmJm+1(τm, tm+1) if tm+1 ≤ T .
Now, tm+1 > T with a probability (1 − p)T−tm , and the occurrence of a given
tm+1 ≤ T has a probability p(1− p)tm+1−tm−1. Hence, writing t+ for tm+1:
Πem(τm) = (1− p)T−tm
T∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t) +
T∑
t+=tm+1
p(1−p)t+−tm−1
[
t+−1∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t) + rt+−tmΠem+1(τm, t+)
]
.
Introduce the notation q = 1− p. Interchanging the order of summation,
Πem(τm) = q
T−tm
T∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t)+
T−1∑
t=tm
rt−tmLm(τm, t)
T∑
t+=t+1
pqt+−tm−1 +
T∑
t+=tm+1
pqt+−tm−1rt+−tmΠem+1(τm, t+) .
Using classical formulas for the sum of a geometric series, and regrouping terms
we obtain for m ≤ T − t1:
Πem(τm) =
T∑
t=tm
qt−tm
[
rt−tmLm(τm, t) + prtm+1−tmΠem+1(τm, t+ 1)
]
,
being agreed that Πem+1(τm, T + 1) = 0. A more useful form of this formula for
the sequel is as follows:
Πem(τm) =
T∑
t=tm
(qr)t−tmLm(τm, t)+
p
q
T∑
tm+1=tm+1
(qr)tm+1−tmΠem+1(τm, tm+1) ,
(6)
where the second term of the right hand side is absent if tm = T .
Remark 2 It is a not-so-easy calculation to check that, if Lm(τm, t) ≤ L and
Πem+1(τm, tm+1) ≤ (T − tm+1 + 1)L, then this formula implies, as it should,
Πem(τm) ≤ (T − tm + 1)L.
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A hint about how to make the above check is as follows: in the second term of the
formula, write
T∑
t=tm+1
qt−tm(T − t+ 1) =
(
T − tm + 1− (1− p) d
dp
) T∑
t=tm+1
(1− p)t−tm ,
and use the classic formula for the sum of the (finite) geometric series.
We use formula (6) recursively: write first Πe1 as a function of Π
e
2, and using again
the same formula substitute for Πe2 as a function of Π
e
3, and again for Π
e
3 as a
function of Πe4. Then interchange the order of the summations, placing them in the
order t, t2, t3, t4. In the following formula, every time the lower bound of a sum is
larger than the upper bound, the term is just absent. We obtain
Πe1 =
T∑
t=t1
(qr)t−t1L1(t1, t) +
p
q
T∑
t=t1+1
(qr)t−t1
t∑
t2=t1+1
L2(t1, t2, t)
+
(
p
q
)2 T∑
t=t1+2
(qr)t−t1
T∑
t2=t1+1
t∑
t3=t2+1
L3(t1, t2, t3, t)
+
(
p
q
)3 T∑
t2=t1+1
T∑
t3=t2+1
T∑
t4=t3+1
(qr)t4−t1Πe4(t1, t2, t3, t4) .
Continuing in the same way up to m = T − t1 + 1, we obtain
Πe1 =
T−t1∑
m=1
(
p
q
)m−1 T∑
t=t1+m−1
(qr)t−t1Mm(t) +
(
p
q
)T−t1
(qr)T−t1LT−t1+1(T ) .
The last term can be identified as the term m = T − t1 + 1 of the first sum, as the
range of t in the embedded (second) sum is limited to t = T , and we have seen
that LT−t1+1(T ) = MT−t1+1(T ). It suffices now to shift m by one unit to obtain
the formula
Πe1 =
T−t1+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1 T∑
t=t1+m−1
[(1− p)r]t−t1Mm(t) .
And interchanging a last time the order of the summations, formula (1).
Remark 3 As a consequence of formula (1), if for some fixed L, for all m, τm and
t, Lm(τm, t) = L, then Πe1 = [(1− rT−t1+1)/(1− r)]L (whose limit as r → 1 is
(T − t1 + 1)L), and if Lm(τm, t) ≤ L, then Πe1 is bounded above by that number.
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A.2 Proof of theorem 2
We start with formula (1) where we set t1 = 0, and recall by a superscript (T ) that
it is a formula for a finite horizon T , the horizon we want to let go to infinity:
Πe1
(T ) =
T∑
t=0
(1− p)trt
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
Mm(t) .
The only task left to prove the theorem is to show that the series obtained as T →
∞ converges absolutely. To do this, we need an evaluation ofMm(t). Observe that
the cardinal of the set Tm(t) is simply the combinatorial coefficient
|Tm(t)| =
(
t
m− 1
)
=
t!
(m− 1)! (t−m+ 1)! .
As a consequence, if |Lm| ≤ Lm, we have
|Mm(t)| ≤
(
t
m− 1
)
Lm
and ∣∣∣∣∣
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
Mm(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
|Mm(t)| (7)
≤
t+1∑
m=1
(
t
m− 1
)(
p
1− p
)m−1
Lm (8)
= L
(
p
1− pL+ 1
)t
. (9)
Therefore,
(1− p)trt
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
|Mm(t)| ≤ Lrt(pL+ 1− p)t .
The series converges absolutely provided that
r
(
p(L− 1) + 1
)
< 1 ,
which is always true if L ≤ 1, and ensured for all p ≤ 1 if rL < 1. This proves
the theorem for the case exponentially bounded.
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In the case uniformly bounded, with |Lm| ≤ L, we obtain similarly
|Mm(t)| ≤
(
t
m− 1
)
L
and
(1− p)trt
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
1− p
)m−1
|Mm(t)| ≤ Lrt(1− p)t
(
p
1− p + 1
)t
= Lrt ,
and the series is always absolutely convergent.
A.4 Proof of theorem 4
We aim to apply formula (3). The term t = 0 requires a special treatment: the only
term in the sum over m is m = 1 and M1(0) = L1(0) = c. For t > 0, we have
three cases:
1. For m = 1, there has not been any new entrant, therefore L1(t) = c.
2. For 1 < m < t + 1, we sum first over the τm such that tm < t, i.e. τm ∈
Tm(t−1), then over the τm such that tm = t; there the sum is over the values
of τm−1 ∈ Tm−1(t− 1).
3. For m = t + 1, there have been new entrants at each time step. Therefore
Lt+1(τt+1, t) = c/2t. We summarize this in the following calculation:
for m = 1 , M1(t) = c = c
(t− 1)!
(m− 1)!(t−m+ 1)!
1
m
,
for 1 < m < t+ 1 , Mm(t) =
∑
τm∈Tm(t−1)
c
m
+
∑
τm−1∈Tm−1(t−1)
c
2(m− 1)
= c
(t− 1)!
(m− 1)!(t−m+ 1)!
1
m
+ c
(t− 1)!
(m− 2)!(t−m+ 1)!
1
2(m− 1) ,
for m = t+ 1 , Mt+1(t) =
c
2t
= c
(t− 1)!
(m− 2)!(t−m+ 1)!
1
2(m− 1) .
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We therefore obtain, for t > 0:
t+1∑
m=1
(
p
q
)m−1
Mm(t) =
t∑
m=1
(
p
q
)m−1 (t− 1)!
(m− 1)!(t−m)!
c
m
+
1
2
t+1∑
m=2
(
p
q
)m−1 (t− 1)!
(m− 2)!(t−m+ 1)!
c
m− 1
=
(
1 +
p
2q
) t∑
m=1
(
p
q
)m−1 (t− 1)!
(m− 1)!(t−m)!
c
m
.
Finally, summing over t as in formula (3), without forgetting the term t = 0,
Πe1 = c+
(
1 +
p
2q
) ∞∑
t=1
rtqt
t∑
m=1
(
p
q
)m−1 (t− 1)!
(m− 1)!(t−m)!
c
m
.
It suffices to take out one power of rq from the sum over t, shift the summation
index by one unit, recognize the expected payoff of the simple sharing scheme and
replace it by formula (4) to prove the theorem.
B Static equilibria
We consider n identical firms (a clone economy) sharing a market with a linear
inverse demand function, linking the price P to the total production level Q as
P = b− aQ .
Production costs have been lumped into b and so doing normalized at zero. We
compute the optimal production levelQ, and resulting price P and profit Π of each
firm for various equilibria.
B.1 Cartel
In a pure cartel, firms behave as a single player, only sharing the optimal production
level equally among them. Let Q be that level. The profit of the (fictitious) single
player is
Π = Q(b− aQ) = −a
(
Q− b
2a
)2
+
b2
4a
.
Hence the optimal production level is Q = b/(2a), to be equally divided among
the firms, as well as the profit Π = b2/(4a). The price is then P = b/2, and the
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individual production level q and profit Πi are
q =
b
2an
, Πi =
b2
4an
.
B.2 Cartel-Stackelberg
We investigate the case where n− 1 firms form a cartel, behaving as a leader vis a`
vis one firm acting as a follower.
Let qL be the quantity produced by each incumbent, qF that of the follower. Hence
Q = (n− 1)qL + qF . The follower’s profit is
ΠF = qF [b− a(n− 1)qL − aqF ] = −a
[
q2F −
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)
qF
]
hence
ΠF = −a
[
qF − 1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)]2
+
a
4
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)2
.
Therefore, the optimal reaction curve qF as a function of qL is
qF =
1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)
.
With such a strategy, each incumbents’ profit is
ΠL = qL
[
b− a(n− 1)qL − 1
2
b− 1
2
a(n− 1)qL)
]
= −a(n− 1)
2
[
q2L −
b
a(n− 1)qL
]
= −a(n− 1)
2
[
qL − b
2a(n− 1)
]2
+
b2
8a(n− 1) .
Therefore, the optimal production level of each incumbent and their profit are
qL =
b
2a(n− 1) , ΠL =
b2
8a(n− 1) .
Placing this back into the optimal follower’s reaction curve, its production level
and profit are
qF =
b
4a
, ΠF =
b2
16a
.
and the price of the commodity is P = b/4. All these results will be summarized
in a table in the last section.
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B.3 Cournot-Nash
We have n identical firms competing a` la Cournot. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium
is obtained as follows. Let q be the individual production level, therefore Q = nq,
and P the resulting price:
P = b− naq .
The individual profit of player i is
Πi = qi[b− a(qi + (n− 1)q)]
= −a
[
qi − 1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)q
)]2
+
a
4
(
b
a
− (n− 1)q
)2
.
It follows that the optimum qi is
qi =
1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)q
)
,
but we seek a symmetric equilibrium where qi = q, and therefore
q =
b
(n− 1)a .
Placing this back into the law for P , we find
P =
b
(n+ 1)
, Π =
b2
a(n+ 1)2
.
B.4 Cournot-Stackelberg
We finally consider n − 1 firms competing a` la Cournot-Nash within their group,
producing a quantity qL each, but that group behaving as a leader vis a` vis a single
follower, producing a quantity qF . We therefore have
P = b− a(n− 1)qL − aqF .
The calculations are similar to the previous ones. The follower’s profit is therefore
ΠF = −a
[
q2F −
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)
qF
]
= −a
[
qF − 1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)]2
+
a
4
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)2
.
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Hence
qF =
1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)
, ΠF =
a
4
(
b
a
− (n− 1)qL
)2
.
With this strategy,
P =
1
2
(
b− a(n− 1)qL
)
=
1
2
(
b− a(n− 2)qL − aqi
)
Consequently, for player i, one of the leaders,
Πi = −a
2
[
q2i −
(
b
a
− (n− 2)qL
)
qi
]
= −a
2
[
qi − 1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 2)qL
)]2
+
a
8
(
b
a
− (n− 2)qL
)2
.
It follows that
qi = qL =
1
2
(
b
a
− (n− 2)qL
)
⇒ qL = b
an
,
Πi =
a
8
(
b
a
− (n− 2)qL
)2
⇒ Πi = b
2
2an2
,
while P = b/(2n), and
qF =
b
2an
and ΠF =
b2
4an2
.
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B.5 Summary
We regroup the results of these calculations in the following table:
Market structure # of firms Quantity Price Profit
Cartel n
b
2an
b
2
b2
4an
Cartel-Stackelberg n
3b
4a
b
4
each leader n− 1 b
2a(n− 1)
b2
8a(n− 1)
follower 1
b
4a
b2
16a
Oligopoly a` la Cournot n
b
a(n+ 1)
b
(n+ 1)
b2
a(n+ 1)2
Cournot-Stackelberg n
b(n+ 1/2)
an
b
2n
each leader n− 1 b
an
b2
2an2
follower 1
b
2an
b2
4an2
C Complexity
In this appendix, we undertake to count the number of arithmetic operations in-
volved in computing Πe1 for a finite horizon by four different methods: (direct)
path enumeration, backward dynamic programming, path enumeration and for-
ward dynamic programming, and use of formula (1). To ease the calculations, we
let t1 = 1, so that T is the number of time steps. We shall refer to the tree of Figure
1.
If we assume no regularity in their definition, the data is made of the collection of
all Lm(t), t = 1, . . . , T , that is as many numbers as there are branches in the tree,
i.e.
T∑
t=1
2t−1 = 2T − 1
numbers. As all must be used, there is no way in which a general method could
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involve less than that number of arithmetic operations. Therefore, we expect a
complexity of the order of 2T (of the order of 106 for T = 20, and 1015 for T = 50,
a completely unrealistic case !), and the difference between methods can only be
in the coefficient multiplying that number.
C.1 Path enumeration
The tree counts 2T−1 paths from the root to a leaf. Let ν ∈ [1, 2T−1] number them.
We denote by piν the path number ν, and let mν be the number of player present at
the end of path piν . Each path has a probability of being followed
P(piν) = pmν−1(1− p)T−mν .
Let Lν(t) denote the Ln(τn, t) on path piν . Each path involves a payoff
Π1(piν) =
T∑
t=1
Lν(t) .
And we have
Πe1 =
2T−1∑
ν=1
P(piν)J(piν) . (10)
A direct method of evaluating Πe is therefore as follows:
1. compute the P(pi(ν)) for each ν. The computation of each involves T − 2
multiplications2. Therefore that step involves 2T−1(T − 2) arithmetic oper-
ations.
2. Compute the Π(piν). Each involves T − 1 additions, therefore this step in-
volves 2T−1(T − 1) arithmetic operations.
3. Compute Πe1 according to formula (10), involving 2
T−1 multiplications and
as many additions (-1), that is 2T operations.
Therefore the total number of arithmetic operations is
N = 2T−1(T − 2 + T − 1 + 2) = (T − 1
2
)2T ,
that is of the order of T2T .
C.2 Dynamic programming (DP)
Denote the nodes of the tree by the sequence σ(t) of t indices, 0 or 1, the 1 de-
noting the times when an arrival occurred, a branch sloping up in our figure. (All
2we count powers as a sequence of multiplications
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sequences σ(t) begin with a one.) The possible successors of a given σ(t) are
(σ(t), 0) and (σ(t), 1), that we denote as
σ(t+ 1) = (σ(t), i(t)) , i(t) ∈ {0, 1} .
Denote by L(σ(t)) the Lm of the branch reaching the node σ(t).
C.2.1 Backward DP
Let V (σ(t)) be the expected future payoff when at node σ(t). It obeys the dynamic
programming equation
V (σ(t)) = p[L(σ(t), 1) + V (σ(t), 1)] + (1− p)[L(σ(t), 0) + V (σ(t), 0)] ,
and Πe1 = V (root) = V (1) + L1(1).
There are thus four arithmetic operations to perform at each node of the tree (not
counting the leaves), that is
N = 4
T∑
t=1
2t−1 = 4× (2T − 1)
arithmetic operations, i.e. of the order of 4× 2T .
C.2.2 Path enumeration and forward DP
This is a variant of the path enumeration method (10) on two counts:
1. Compute once each probability pm−1(1 − p)T−m and store it. This costs
T (T − 2) arithmetic operations.
2. Compute the Π(piν) according to the forward dynamic programming method
Π(σ(t− 1), i(t− 1)) = Π(σ(t− 1)) + L(σ(t− 1), i(t− 1)) .
This is one addition at each node of the tree, i.2. 2T operations.
It remains to implement formula (10), using 2T arithmetic operations, for a total of
2T+1 + T (T − 2). This is of the order of 2× 2T .
C.3 Using the Mm(t)
We rewrite formula (1) as
Πe1 =
T∑
t=1
t∑
m=1
pm−1(1− t)t−mMm(t) . (11)
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C.3.1 Computing the Mm(t)
The first task is to compute the collection of Mm(t). For each t, there are 2t−1
Lm(t) to combine in t terms, that is 2t−1 − t additions. There is no computation
for the steps 1 and 2. The total number of additions there is therefore
T∑
t=3
(2t−1 − t) = 2T − T (T + 1)
2
− 1 .
C.3.2 Computing the pm−1(1− p)t−m
We set
um(t) = p
m−1(1− p)t−m .
We compute them according to the following method:
u1(1) = 1 ,
∀t ∈ [2, T ] , u1(t) = (1− p)u1(t− 1) ,
∀m ∈ [1, t] , um+1(t) = pum(t− 1) .
Counting the arithmetic operations, this leads to T − 1 multiplications to compute
the u1(t), and to
T∑
t=3
(t− 1) = T (T − 1)
2
− 3
multiplications to compute the rest of the um(t). That is for this step
T (T − 1)
2
+ T − 4
arithmetic operations.
C.3.3 Applying formula (11)
Finally, there are T (T+1)/2 terms in formula (11), each involving a multiplication
and an addition, i.e. T (T + 1) arithmetic operations (minus one addition)
Summing all steps, this is
N = 2T + T 2 + T − 6
i.e. of the order of 2T arithmetic operations, half as many as in the best DP method.
32
C.4 Conclusion
Our theory gives the fastest algorithm for this general “unstructured” case, half as
many algebraic operations as in the next best. But of course, its main advantage
is elsewhere, in allowing one to take advantage of any regularity in the definitions
of the Lm, and also in allowing for closed formulas for the infinite horizon case.
Formula (4) is a typical example.
A general remark is that going from the “direct” method, in T2T arithmetic op-
erations to one with a constant coefficient, in a typical computer science tradeoff,
we trade computer time for storage space. However, if the Lm need to be stored
as data (as opposed to being given by some explicit formula), then in all the faster
methods, they are used only once so that their memory space can be re-used for
intermediate results.
D Dynamic Nash equilibrium
We have stressed that, in our applications, we seek an equilibrium at each time
step. But our process is then a sequence of static equilibria, not a dynamic equi-
librium. As stated in the main body, our theory does not address the determination
of a dynamic equilibrium. In the finite horizon case, it is possible to extend the
theory to encompass a dynamic equilibrium, computed retrogressively a` la Isaacs,
using (a discrete time parallel of) the theory of piecewise deterministic systems.
(See [Sworder, 1969, Davis, 1985, Haurie et al., 1994]). But we see little applica-
bility of that extended theory. We give a short account of it here for the sake of
completeness.
Let U(t) be a set of possible decisions at time t for the (identical) players. We
consider situations where the focal player, say player 1, uses the decisions a(t) ∈
U(t), and all other players decisions b(t) ∈ U(t). This suffices according to Isaacs’
tenet of transition (Bellman’s optimality principle), because all players present at
a given time face the same game problem regarding the future, regardless of when
they arrived. Let α(t) be the sequence of decisions u(s) of player 1 from s = t1
up to s = t− 1, and β(t) the sequence of decisions of all other players, also up to
time t − 1. (And for t ≤ t2, we set b(t) = nil.) Let Lm(τm, α(t), a, β(t), b, t) be
the per stage payoff of the players. (It could also depend on α(t) and β(t).)
Instead of the expected payoff Πem, introduce a family of Value functions Vm de-
fined for t ≥ tm:
Vm(τm, α(t), β(t), t) .
33
Nash equilibrium strategies a?(·) must satisfy
Vm({α(t), a?(t)}, {β(t), a?(t)}, t) =
max
a∈U(t)
[
Lm(τm, α(t), a, β(t), a
∗(t))+
pVm+1({τm, t}, {α(t), a}, {β(t), a?(t)}, t+ 1)
+ (1− p)Vm(τm, {α(t), a}, {α(t), a?(t), t+ 1)
]
.
the maximum being reached at a = a?. This recursion, initialized at
Vm(·, ·, ·, T ) = 0 ,
may theoretically allow one to compute the Value functions Vm and the equilibrium
decisions.
Of course, this simplifies if the dependence of the Lm on τm, α and β is through a
state equation such as hinted at at the beginning of our section 3. But even so, we
see little applicability of that theory.
One exception might be in the very un-natural case of an infinite horizon problem
with such a state living in a finite dimensional (or better: finite) space, where U is
constant, and where the Lm are of the form
Lm(α(t), a, β(t), b, t) = r
tsmL(x(t), a1, a2, . . . , am) .
Let Vm(x(t), t) = rtsmWm(x). Then the above equation takes the form of a
modified Shapley equation:
Wm(x) = max
a∈U
[
Lm(x, a, a?, . . . , a?)
+ prsWm+1(f(x, a, a
?, . . . , a?))
+ (1− p)rWm(f(x, a, a?, . . . , a?)
]
.
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